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1. NEW DAWN 
 
The potency of the phrase „The Arab Spring‟ remains undiminished by its 
over-use since a young Tunisian man, Mohamed Bouazizi, set himself on fire 
on 18 December 2010. In much the same way as the domino effect of the fall 
of the Berlin Wall, references to the Arab Spring provide a short-hand 
description of the wave of public demonstrations and violent reprisals that 
have occurred, and continue to occur, across the entire Middle East. The fall-
out of these events have also spread beyond the region; for instance, the coup 
d’etat in Mali (21 March 2012) and even the protests attendant upon the 
presidential election of Vladimir Putin in Russia have all been ascribed to this 
climatic event. Crucially, the Arab Spring has also resulted in the adjustment 
and re-alignment of global politics and alliances. No better example of this is 
provided by the undignified scramble by US politicians on both sides of the 
political divide to sunder their long-standing political, economic and military 
support of the regime of Egypt‟s Murbarak. And, ultimately, it has required 
western powers to attempt reconciliation with political Islam, or at the least, 
with the alleged „moderate‟ powers of the Islamic Brotherhood, who appear to 
have achieved their long-sought political ambitions through the ballot box.
2
 
To a large extent, therefore, the end of Muammar Qaddafi‟s tyranny and 
despotic rule in Libya may be subsumed into the wider politics of the region. 
And yet, Libya is different in one essential fact: the Arab Spring in Libya was 
played out with direct foreign military intervention.
3
 Moreover, this was a 
                                                   
1 Law School, University of Greenwich. 
2 This accommodation with moderate Islam, of course, is neither unique nor radical. 
Turkey‟s ruling party is exactly that: moderate and Islamic, and there has been no 
hesitation in accepting Turkey‟s place in global politics, its position as a crucial 
member of NATO and, indeed, as a possible future member of the EU. 
3 There are, of course, comparisons to be made with other military interventions in the 
Middle-East, particularly Iraq. For a further discussion, reference may be made to: 
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military intervention which had received the tacit approval of the UN Security 
Council. The defining difference is that the people of Tunisia and Egypt 
achieved their ambitions without this element of foreign, military, 
intervention. To put it in stark terms, there were no bombings of Tunis or 
Cairo by NATO warships or airplanes. As far as Libya was concerned, 
Qaddafi‟s hold on power was so entrenched that the momentous events of the 
Arab Spring would not have had the effect it did if it were not for, 
 
...a controversial military intervention that has been variously 
described as everything from a neo-imperial regime change to a 
humanitarian rescue mission. It moved Libya‟s revolt and the entire 
Arab Spring into a new phase.
4
 
 
The Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions – and revolution is the appropriate 
term – were, in this sense, autochthonous; foreign intervention did not 
mediate the momentous political changes that occurred.
5
 
To what extent, therefore, was the NATO operation in Libya justified and 
justifiable? That this question is a crucial one, not just in terms of Libya but in 
a wider context, is neatly encapsulated in the inertia of the UN, no less in the 
face of events in Syria and the intransigence of the Assad regime but also in 
the Saudi Arabian intervention in Bahrain.
6
  
 
2. LIBYA: THE JAMAHIRIYA 
 
Qaddafi‟s brand of revolution in Libya had long been a thorn in 
international politics. Yet, it is necessary to set Qaddafi in the context of 
                                                                                                                         
Ronald St John, “Libya is not Iraq: Preemptive Strikes, WMD and Diplomacy” 
(2004) 53:3 Middle East Journal 386. 
4 Lin Noueihed and Alex Warren The Battle for the Arab Spring: Revolution, 
Counter-Revolution and the Making of New Era (New Haven, USA: Yale University 
Press 2012) p165. 
5 The term „autochthonous‟, in its usage in Constitutional Law, refers to those 
constitutions of the „new‟ Commonwealth states that were the product of negotiation, 
deliberation and proclamation of their independent legislative assemblies, rather than 
imposed upon them though the form of a „grant‟ from the Foreign and 
Commonwealth office, contained in the UK Act of Parliament that conferred 
independence. 
6 Further references may be made to Lin Noueihed and Alex Warren The Battle for 
the Arab Spring: Revolution, Counter-Revolution and the Making of New Era (New 
Haven, USA: Yale University Press 2012). 
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Libya‟s experiences of colonialism and exploitation.7 It would not be 
exaggeration to state that the ebb and flow of „Great Power‟ politics has 
swirled over Libya and its peoples since, at least the dawn of the modern era. 
The period following the end of Italian colonial rule after the Second World 
War was followed by even greater confusion, with the United Kingdom, 
France, the United States and the USSR vying for primacy of their strategic 
interests. The matter received a resolution of sorts with the UN General 
Assembly Resolution of 21 November 1949 which stipulated that Libya 
should become independent as soon as possible, by 1 January 1952 at the 
latest. As Pargeter puts it: 
 
Libya was to be free at last. Yet for all the happiness this news 
engendered, it was tainted slightly by the fact that independence was a 
direct result of manoeuvrings on the part of the Big Powers, rather 
than of a hard-earned liberation struggle. Indeed, the Libyans had been 
relegated to the very lowest rung of the decision-making ladder – as 
with so much in their historical experience, independence was 
something that had happened to them and in spite of them.
8
 
 
Qaddafi‟s rise to power as well as his subsequent gesture politics - from 
the proclamation of his Green Revolution
9
, to his support of the IRA, to the 
shooting of WPC Yvonne Fletcher, no less than the Lockerbie affaire
10
 - must 
be seen in this context. The numerous attempts to reign in the charismatic and 
troublesome Libyan leader were merely met with even more defiance: 
 
The nation should realise and the West must understand that we are 
not being affected by the blockade, the boycott, the air embargo or 
anything else. We hope that there won‟t be any relations at all 
                                                   
7 A more detailed discussion of the these issues is to be found in the following: Ali 
Ahmida, Forgotten Voice: Power and Agency in Colonial and PostColonial Libya 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2005); David Blundy and Andrew Lycett Qaddafi and the 
Libyan Revolution (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987); Dirk Vandewalle A 
History of Modern Libya (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Alison 
Pargeter Libya: The Rise and Fall of Qaddafi (New Haven, USA: Yale University 
Press, 2012). 
8 Ibid, p 33. 
9 The political ideology, if it may be termed as such, behind Qaddafi‟s Green Book 
(Tripoli: World Centre for the Study and Research of the Green Book, 1984) was 
nothing other than a continuation of Qaddafi‟s personality cult. 
10 The events surrounding the bombing of a Pan Am flight over Lockerbie on 21 
December 1988 have been extensively rehearsed. See, for instance, Pargeter, above.  
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between us and the West, that none of their goods get here, that we 
won‟t buy anything from [them]. What matters is that they spare us 
their evil and harm, and that the sea is between them and us. Good that 
we are rid of them as it were.
11
 
 
To this intoxicating mix must be added (with the benefit of hindsight) the 
bizarre scramble by Western leaders to welcome Colonel Muammar Qaddafi 
back into global politics in the ten-year period or so before the NATO 
operations that terminated his rule.  
 
For London and Washington, rehabilitating the Libyan leader from 
malevolent pariah to cooperative autocrat involved a controversial 
rapprochement with a man they considered responsible for numerous 
acts of overseas terrorism. But it was also hailed as a triumph for years 
of patient diplomacy designed to engage, not overthrow, a regime that 
almost from its very creation had stirred up international trouble.
12
  
 
After Saddam Hussein‟s Iraq, the Taleban in Afghanistan and the mullahs 
of Iran, it seemed, mistakenly as events proved, that Qaddafi (and his son, 
Saif al-Islam Qaddafi) was a man with whom the West could do business.  
In addition, a factor that is crucial in understanding the events in Libya, 
both during the Qaddafi regime as well as post-Qaddafi, is the tribal nature of 
Libyan society. Libya was not, and never has been, a one-nation state. What 
was true during the colonial period continued to be true after independence 
and during the Qaddafi regime. To this extent, there is a certainly symmetry 
between Libya and the other nations of the Arab Spring. It is possible to go 
further and consider this to be an emblematic facet of these nations, where a 
nexus of family-tribal-clan loyalties are prioritised above that towards the 
central State: 
 
„We follow the ways of our forefathers, those who kindled wars and 
were faithful to the ties of kinship‟.13 This … expressed the very 
                                                   
11 Speech by Muammar Qaddafi, Libyan television, 21 September 1993, quoted in: 
Alison Pargeter Libya: The Rise and Fall of Qaddafi (New Haven, USA: Yale 
University Press, 2012) p 157. 
12 Lin Noueihed and Alex Warren The Battle for the Arab Spring: Revolution, 
Counter-Revolution and the Making of New Era (New Haven, USA: Yale University 
Press, 2012) p 166. 
13 Abid ibn al-Abras; see footnote below. 
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essence of an Arab‟s identity. Extended networks of relatives blurred 
seamlessly into tribe.
14
 
 
The fault lines in Libya political society were, to a very large extent, 
submerged during the final months leading to the fall of the regime. 
Nevertheless, these fault lines did not miraculously disappear: with the defeat 
of the common enemy, the long-seething racial, tribal and clan tensions that 
had festered for generations have emerged to threaten whatever the political 
resolution may be, post-democratic elections. To the powerful mix of 
opposing loyalties may be added two factors. First, the presence of abundant 
weapons has given the various warring factions a potency that would not 
otherwise have existed. There have been numerous instances of this seizure of 
power and the contempt of central government, particularly of the National 
Transitional Council, as in the arrest and detention of lawyers acting for the 
International Criminal Court and the refusal to hand over Saif Al-Islam to the 
central authorities.
15
 
The proliferation of weapons among the general population and especially 
amongst the katiba brigades,
16
 has been remarked on in the Report of the 
Committee of Experts submitted to the Security Council in the aftermath of 
the NATO intervention.
17
  
 
33. The distribution of arms to civilians and the appropriation of the 
content of weapons and ammunition storage sites by individuals and 
brigades resulted in the uncontrolled circulation of very large 
quantities of military materiel during the war. Additional military 
materiel was also delivered during the conflict from abroad and there 
were apparently no accountability measures to follow the distribution 
of this materiel on the ground.  
 
34. Four months after the end of the conflict, a significant percentage 
of the civilian population is armed and the brigades control very large 
                                                   
14 Tom Holland In the Shadow of the Sword (London: Little Brown Group, 2012) p 
232. 
15 The unpredictability of these small groups of ex-rebel fighters may be illustrated by 
the abduction of the president of the Libyan Olympic Committee on the 15 July 2012 
(The Times, 17 July 2012). 
16 Katiba is the Arabic term used in Libya for the rebel brigades that fought the 
Qaddafi regime. These units varied in size and level of allegiance. Crucially, not all of 
the katiba have been disbanded and there is no realistic possibility of accounting for 
the stock of weapons possessed. 
17 S/2012/163 (www.un.org/sc/committees/1970/). 
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quantities of weapons and ammunition stocks. The lack of a unified 
command over the katibas3 and the absence of a national force to 
oversee the arms stocks represent considerable challenges in terms of 
post-conflict weapons management and control. 
 
37. Finally, it is clear that a number of people seized the opportunity 
to make a profit by removing weapons from stores opened up during 
the conflict and selling them. Since the end of the conflict, the Panel 
has been made aware of information which indicates that individuals 
in Libya have made contact with foreign brokers in an attempt to sell 
military materiel.  
 
Second, as in Saddam Hussein‟s Iraq, Islamic extremists who had been 
suppressed (through imprisonment, murder and torture) by Qaddafi were now 
free to act. It is a fact that in many essential respects, the only unifying feature 
lies in the adherence to a common religion. It is noteworthy, after all, that the 
demonstrators against despotism, cronyism and corruption throughout the 
region consciously echo the Qu‟aranic injunction: 
 
Account is demanded of those who oppress people and commit 
transgression on earth, unjustly. To them there is painful torment.
18
 
 
As far as this latter point is concerned, those who might be tempted to 
point to the resurgence of the Islamists in Iraq, Egypt and Tunisia as a 
benchmark to measure the legitimacy of intervention, may be heartened by the 
fact that events so far indicate that the role of religion may not be the defining 
factor of post-conflict Libya. Despite the activities of Islamists groups such as 
Al Watan (led by Abdul Hakim Bilhaj, the former jihadist fighter who is now 
suing the British government for complicity in rendition and torture)
19
 it 
appears that the Islamist parties have made little headway in the country‟s first 
democratic elections.
20
 
 
                                                   
18 Qur’an:42.42 – 3. 
19 Richard Norton-Taylor and Ian Cobain, “Libyan dissidents sue MI6 officer over 
abduction and torture claims” The Guardian, 31 July 2012: 
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/31/libyan-dissidents-sue-mi6.  
20 Although the new Prime Minister, Mohammed Magarief, is described as an Islamist 
(albeit a „moderate‟) Libya‟s first free and fair elections (7 July 2012) has resulted in 
the dominance of the broadly secular National Forces Alliance: 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19204111.  
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3. SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION 
 
Events in Libya by 2010 had begun to cause concern. It was clear that the 
re-integration of Libya into the political order was a failure. Internally, too, 
there began to be an intensification of the repressive tendencies that had 
always sustained the regime. Matters came to be focussed on Security Council 
Resolution 1970 (2011), whereby the Security Council expressed grave 
concern over the situation in Libya including the violence and use of force 
against civilians and the gross and systematic violation of human rights. The 
Resolution expressed grave concerns regarding, inter alia, the use of force 
against civilians and deplored, 
 
…the gross and systematic violations of human rights, including the 
repression of peaceful demonstrators, expressing deep concern at the 
deaths of civilians, and rejecting unequivocally the incitement to 
hostility and violence against the civilian population made from the 
highest level of the Libyan government.
21
 
 
Within this context, the Security Council imposed specific measures on 
Libya including the arms embargo, which related to arms and related materiel 
of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and 
equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, in 
addition to the provision of armed mercenary personnel. The Security Council 
also imposed an asset freeze which related to all funds, financial assets and 
economic resources which were owned, or controlled directly or indirectly, by 
the designated individuals or entities listed in the resolution. Further, the 
Council decided that the asset freeze and travel ban should apply to the 
individuals and entities designated by the Committee involved in or complicit 
in ordering, controlling or otherwise directing the commission of serious 
human rights abuses against persons in Libya. 
This was rapidly followed by Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011) 
whereby the Council strengthened the enforcement of the arms embargo and 
expanded the scope of the asset freeze to include the exercise of vigilance 
when doing business with Libyan entities, if States had information that 
provided reasonable grounds to believe that such business could contribute to 
violence and use of force against civilians.
22
 Additional individuals subject to 
                                                   
21 S/RES/1970 (26 February 2011). 
22 S/RES/1973 (17 March 2011); the Resolution was adopted with 10 votes in favour, 
none against and 5 abstentions. Voting in favour: Britain, France, United States (SC 
permanent members) and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Colombia, Gabon, Lebanon, Nigeria, 
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the asset freeze and the travel ban were listed in the resolution. Resolution 
1973 (2011) also included the authorization to protect civilians and civilian 
populated areas under threat of attack in Libya and authorised UN Member 
States, acting alone or through regional organisations to “take all necessary 
measures to protect civilians under threat of attack.” Crucially, Resolution 
1973 (in paragraphs 6 – 12) imposed a no-fly zone over the airspace of the 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. 
As noted below, serious problems arise concerning the legitimacy of 
Resolution 1973/2011. It would be too simplistic to argue that as the Security 
Council had authorised intervention, ergo, military intervention was 
legitimate. The assumption must be that military intervention was authorised 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (“Action with respect to threats to the 
peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression”). What then of the long-
established and long-cherished doctrine of non-intervention, explicitly and 
implicitly recognised in the UN Charter, particularly in Article 2(4), 
especially as this entailed external support for insurgent forces? The judgment 
of the ICJ in the Nicaragua Case is apposite here.
23
 
Articles 2(4) of the UN Charter (1945) contain an explicit principle 
against foreign intervention in relation to “territorial integrity or political 
independence” while Article 2(7) extends the principle against non-
intervention to “matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction.” It is true that Article 2(7) goes on to enter the caveat that “this 
principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under 
Chapter VII of the Charter. On this basis it can be argued that SC Resolutions 
1970 and 1973 were justified as „enforcement measures‟. It must be noted, 
however, that Chapter VII enforcement action requires the explicit 
determination by the Security Council of “the existence of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression” (under Article 39). SC 
Resolution 1973, however, does not spell out in what manner the events in 
Libya came within a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or acts of 
aggression. The issues relating to intervention in purely internal disputes 
(even when amounting to civil war) are both complex and controversial. It is 
submitted that in the light of General Assembly resolutions such as the 
Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
                                                                                                                         
Portugal and South Africa (non-permanent members). Abstentions: Russia and China 
(SC permanent members) Germany, Brazil and India (SC non-permanent members). 
23 Nicaragua (Merits) Nicaragua v United States ICJ Reports 1986, p14. A detailed 
analysis of the decision of the ICJ is not possible here but reference may be made to 
para 199 – 211 of the Report. A brief summary of the impact of the decision may also 
be found in David Harris Cases and Materials on International Law (London: Sweet 
and Maxwell, 7th ed, 2010) pp 738 – 742. 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
 
 
47 
 
Relations and co-Operation among States in accordance with the charter of 
the UN
24
 that the general tenor of opinion has been that internal disputes are 
not grounds for intervention.
25
 In this context, the Nicaragua v US case is 
instructive. The ICJ, indeed, went even further in affirming that this 
constituted customary international law.
26
  
It has been argued that there is newly evolved principle Article 2(4) would 
permit intervention on humanitarian grounds. These issues were explored in 
relation to NATO action in Kosovo in 1999,
27
 but can hardly be said to have 
been completely resolved, bearing in mind the clear objections of Russia and 
China as well as the non-aligned grouping of States.
28
 Gray has commented 
that that “the UK more than any other State has developed a doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention as an autonomous institution.”29 In developing her 
objections on this issue, Gray goes on to state: 
 
Those who support a doctrine of humanitarian intervention often rely 
on earlier, pre-Iraq practice. … But in these episodes the States using 
force did not actually invoke a doctrine of humanitarian intervention; 
they preferred to reply on the better established right to self-defence. 
Several States said that violations of human rights could not justify the 
use of force. Now there is an attempt to re-write history in order to try 
and justify the action in Kosovo. This requires that we ignore what the 
States in question actually said and therefore seems inconsistent with 
the approach of the ICJ in the Nicaragua case. The Court in 
considering whether a new doctrine of forcible intervention to help 
opposition forces to overthrow the government had emerged through 
State practice put great stress on the fact that neither the USA itself, 
nor other States, had claimed such a right.
30
 
 
It is submitted that the failure of the Security Council in Resolution 1973 
to make explicit the basis for the intervention impugns both the initial 
                                                   
24 GA Resolution 2625 (XXV) 24 October 1970. 
25 It is conceded that an exception may require to be drawn in relation to acts of 
terrorism. 
26 Nicaragua v United States (Merits) (1986) ICJ Reports, p14, paras 202 – 209. 
27 Legality of use of Force (Yugoslavia v Belgium) Provisional Measures, Order of 2 
June 1999; ICJ Reports (1999) p124. 
28 1999 UNYB 332. 
29 Christine Gray “The Use of Force and the International Legal Order” in Malcolm 
Evans (ed) International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2nd edn, 2006) p 595. 
30 Ibid. 
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unilateral action by France
31
 as well as the subsequent NATO operation. It 
might even be conceded that a distinction needs to be drawn between military 
intervention (in this case the imposition of the no-fly zone) for humanitarian 
purposes and illegitimate interference in domestic affairs; it may be a line in 
the sand, but it is a line still and it is, therefore incumbent that the justification 
be made explicit. 
Chapter VII, moreover, contains a long list of the pre-requisites and 
conditions attendant upon the exercise of this power. In this regard, it is 
submitted that the pre-requisites required by Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
did not exist or were not put in place. The first point to be raised relates to 
Article 39 of the UN Charter. This requires that the Security Council should 
make a prior determination of „the existence of any threat to the peace, breach 
of the peace or act of aggression‟. It is difficult to see how the events in Libya, 
brutal though Qaddafi‟s repression of his own people might be, constituted 
such a threat; at this point in time Qaddafi was not a threat to the global order 
(though he may have been in the past, and might conceivable be in the future). 
While it is true that in Rwanda it was an internal armed conflict, not an 
external threat, which triggered action under Article 39, the effective trigger 
was genocide and the impact of the internal struggle on neighbouring states. 
Second, Article 41, although not mandatory, recommends a consideration of 
„measures not involving the use of armed force.‟ It is submitted that the full 
range of options listed in Article 41 were not effectively considered. 
Third, no attempt was made by the Security Council to comply with the 
requirements of Articles 46 and 47, in relation to the establishment of a 
Military Staff Committee – an essential pre-requisite of scrutiny and 
accountability, especially in relation to the military rules of engagement. It is 
submitted that the surrender of this function to NATO, while it was pragmatic 
and ultimately successful, was not just a dereliction of legal duty but also 
unlawful under the principles of international law. It is conceded that neither 
Articles 46 nor 47 have played a dominant role in recent instances of Security 
Council interventions. Nonetheless, the continued role of the Military Staff 
Committee has been continually re-affirmed. Rather than being a dead-letter, 
the Military Staff Committee has met regularly and there is no evidence that it 
Is not prepared to carry out the functions assigned to it under Article 47. This 
is made clear in Cases 18 - 21 cited in the Security Council Repertoire.
32
 It 
should be further noted that in the Cases cited, the Russian representative took 
                                                   
31 Libya: French Plane Fires on Military Vehicle, BBC On-Line News, 19th March 
2011: www.bbc.co.uk.  
32 “Relations with other United Nations Organs”: www.un.org/en/sc/reportoire/ 
(pages 250 – 252). 
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the opportunity to re-iterate the role of the Military Staff Committee.
33
 At the 
same time, in Case 19, the representative for China, at the Security Council‟s 
4223
rd
 meeting called for “the full use of the capacity of the Military Staff 
Committee as an important source for military expertise both for preparing for 
the possible deployment of an operation and for wrapping one up”.34 
It is in this context i.e. the attempt to locate intervention on a wide-
ranging concept of humanitarianism, that it is necessary to remember that 
state practice has been generally hostile. The early stages of the conflict in 
Rwanda offer an example of this, an attitude that also appeared to be shared 
by high officials at the UN. As Michael Barnett notes: 
 
There was a growing belief at the UN that its survival and the 
effectiveness of peacekeeping depended on honouring the principles 
of consent, neutrality and impartiality, which fed directly into a policy 
of non-use of force, even in the face of civilian killings.
35
 
 
Barnett also notes that the then Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali, as well 
as his successor, Kofi Annan were equally reluctant and muzzled their 
officials who sought to advocate a contrary view.
36
 
It is clear that this had long been the position of the influential Group of 
77. For instance, the Ministerial Declaration of Foreign Ministers of the 
Group of 77 (representing the opinion of 132 UN Member States), meeting on 
24 September 1999 (3 months after the end of the NATO bombing campaign 
in Yugoslavia) had concluded: 
 
The Ministers stressed the need to maintain clear distinctions between 
humanitarian assistance and other activities of the United Nations. 
They rejected the so-called right of humanitarian intervention, which 
has no basis in the UN Charter or international law.
37
 
 
                                                   
33 Ibid; S/PV.4220, p9 (Case 18);S/PV.4257 (resumption 1, p13 (Case 20); 
S/PV.4343, p 6 (Case 21). 
34 Ibid; S/PV.4223, p15 (Case 19). 
35 Michael Barnett Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism (New York: 
Cornell University Press, 2011) p 181. 
36 Ibid, p 184.  
37 Cited in Ian Brownlie Principles of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 7th edn, 2008) p 744. This also appeared to be position taken 
subsequently by the United States, in the early stages of the conflict in Rwanda, as 
documented by Samantha Power A Problem from Hell: America in an Age of 
Genocide (New York: Norton, 2002). 
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In the case of Libya, it should be remembered that at the point when it had 
already become abundantly clear that Qaddafi was engaged in the brutal and 
bloody assault on Libyan protesters, the initial US position was of reluctance 
and even down-right hostility to the suggestion of intervention. The US 
Defence Secretary, Robert gates dismissed the notion, out of hand, that there 
should be even the imposition of a no-fly zone.
38
 
 
4. R2P AND THE SPECIAL STATUS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW 
 
For present purposes, the following definition of humanitarian 
intervention may suffice: it is  
 
“the treat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of 
states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations 
of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own 
citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory 
force is applied”.39 
 
To put it simply, if a state cannot, or refuses to, accord to its citizens their 
fundamental and universal human rights, then “the duty to safeguard these 
rights reverts to the international community.
40
 It is implicit in arguments of 
this nature (not shared globally) that human rights law must be acquired a 
primacy that trumps all other concerns of international law and politics. 
The doctrine of humanitarian intervention has had a chequered history, 
based upon suspicion of Big Power politics, as well as the inevitable fact that 
„humanitarian‟ intervention too often results in further counter-productive 
violence and bloodshed. Michael Barnett expresses it thus: 
 
…the history of humanitarianism is littered with violent actions in the 
name of humanity. … Today humanitarian intervention valorizes 
military force to protect the “people”, intimating that such violence is 
“responsible” and that failure to use violence to protect the weak is an 
“irresponsible” or immoral act that creates something close to a moral 
equivalence between perpetrator and the bystander. My point is not to 
                                                   
38 Statement of Robert Gates, US Defence Secretary, “No-fly zone for Libya would 
Require Attack” www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/02/us-libya-usa-pentagon-idUST.  
39 J L Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate”, in J L Holzgrefe and R.O 
Keohane (ed) Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) p 18. 
40 Ibid, p 42. 
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reproach humanitarian intervention – I find it impossible to 
contemplate the killings in Rwanda, Darfur, and the Congo without 
demanding the deployment of all necessary means – but rather to 
point out that doctrines of humanity have always demanded their share 
of violence. Given humanitarianism‟s history, there is no reason to bet 
on a different future.
41
 
 
Even in those, albeit exceptional situations where it can be conceded that 
humanitarian intervention may be necessary and even justified,
42
 a further 
central issue of concern remains: is humanitarian intervention ever possible 
without regime change? And if the ultimate primacy of purpose is, indeed, 
regime change, how can this be squared with the provisions of the UN Charter 
and with the fundamental realities of global politics? It is submitted that it was 
the concerns expressed regarding the legality of humanitarian intervention 
that has led to its basic substance being re-cast as the „Responsibility to 
Protect Doctrine‟ (reduced to R2P for the age of Twitter and text-speak). 
The UN General Assembly adopted R2P in an unanimous resolution 
(UNGA Resolution 60/1, 2005) as a part of the then UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Anan‟s reform agenda, in particular to manoeuvre around the obstacle of 
inviolable state sovereignty: 
 
… if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on 
sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to 
gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every 
precept of our common humanity.
43
 
 
This was echoed by the work of the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICSS) which has advocated “a transition 
from a culture of sovereign impunity to a culture of national and international 
accountability.” To put it in other terms, R2P necessitated a move from 
„sovereignty as control‟ to „sovereignty as responsibility‟. The „pillars‟ of R2P 
may be set out as follows: 
 
                                                   
41 Michael Barnett Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism (New York: 
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1. A State has responsibility to protect its population from mass 
atrocities. 
2. The international community has a responsibility to assist the State 
if it is unable to protect its population on its own. 
3. If a State fails to protect its citizens from mass atrocities and 
peaceful measures have failed, the international community has the 
responsibility to intervene through coercive measures. 
 
These pillars, therefore, have the unavoidable corollary that military 
intervention must remain the last resort.  
Prior to Libya, the intervention in the former Yugoslavia, had been the 
model held up for praise. The NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, commencing 
on 24 March 1999 was based on the claim that it was necessitated by 
humanitarian objectives. Needless to say, there is no common agreement 
among international lawyers.
44
 Ian Brownlie, for instance, is of the clear view 
that, 
 
… the authenticity of the subsequent claims that the action had 
humanitarian motives is substantially undermined by the fact that, 
beginning in October 1998, the threats of force were linked directly to 
a collateral political agenda, that is, the acceptance by Yugoslavia of 
various political „demands concerning the status of Kosovo, these 
„demands‟ being presented under threat of a massive bombing 
campaign.
45
 
 
It is possible to re-cast the same argument in the context of Libya: 
intervention in Libya, rather than being motivated by a humanitarian impulse 
was instead pre-determined by a desire to remove Qaddafi. To put it bluntly: 
this was regime change, pure and simple. Just as in Kosovo, military 
intervention may have been morally justified, but was it legally justified? 
Anne-Marie Slaughter (former Head of Policy Planning, US State 
Department) put the case for intervention succinctly, drawing on the failure to 
prevention genocide in Rwanda and the perceived success of intervention in 
Kosovo: “The international community cannot stand by and watch the 
massacre of Libyan protesters. In Rwanda we watched. In Kosovo we 
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acted.”46 These sentiments were echoed by Hilary Clinton, US Secretary of 
State: “We learned a lot in the 1990s. We saw what happened in Rwanda.”47 
This represents a noticeable theme, that of atonement for the failure to 
intervene in Rwanda, in the debates surrounding the Libyan intervention. As 
Michael Barnett puts it, Rwanda haunts the international community: 
 
…it is because “our” complicity is undeniable. It was not only the 
killing that was shocking. So, too, was the West‟s apparent 
indifference. There certainly have been many other moments when the 
West has chosen to ignore mass killings, but never before when there 
were 2,5000 UN troops on the ground. … In other words, the West 
had blood on its hands. Choosing not to act when it had knowledge 
and opportunity to stop a genocide, according to many, was 
tantamount to contributing to genocide itself.
48
 
 
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, in the way it played out in 
Libya was in many ways unique and this is an essential factor to weigh in the 
balance of its legitimacy. For a start, R2P in Libya took place in the context of 
the wider events in the Arab world, where it appeared that a „Berlin Wall – 
domino effect‟ would leave the adherents of humanitarian intervention, and 
the West generally, floundering. “Libya presented an opportunity to join a 
battle that appeared to pit popular will against evil regime, and to emerge on 
the right side of history.”49 Crucially, it offered an opportunity to ameliorate 
the downright hostility in the Arab world consequent upon the war in Iraq: 
 
…western intervention so soon after Iraq would require Arab support. 
That too was on the table, but again was driven by more than just 
humanitarian considerations. It is hard to think of a case other than 
Libya, and a moment in time other than March 2011, where so many 
Arab countries would have either supported, or abstained from 
objecting to, Western-led action in a Muslim and Arab country.
50
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And what was true of the Arab world was true also of the two major 
obstacles to intervention on the Security Council: China and Russia. 
Unlike the worsening situation in Syria, Libya no longer had friends it 
could count on when the Security Council was seized of the matter; 
Qaddafi had effectively burnt his bridges. 
In the final analysis, what are we to make of R2P intervention? It 
may be that it is the very nature of „R2P‟ terminology itself that stands 
as an obstacle to its proper evaluation. It also begs the question as to 
whether R2P is anything other than „humanitarianism‟, in the sense that 
earlier generations of political scientists and international lawyers 
would have used that term. It is, of course, true that humanitarianism 
(especially in its oft-cited guise of liberal humanitarianism) has become 
too-much freighted with unnecessary baggage.51 Nonetheless, it is 
worth reiterating that the critical change has been the paradigm shift 
from a „right‟ to intervene (based on self-justifying notions of 
„Western‟ superiority carried over from a colonialist mind-set) towards 
a focus on the „duty‟ to intervene. The latter finding expression from a 
fundamental shift towards an acknowledgement of the special place of 
human rights law in the global legal order.  
In the context of global politics in the 21
st
 Century, the fall of 
Tripoli was “the first unambiguous military enforcement of the 
Responsibility to Protect norm; Qaddafi‟s utter defeat seemingly 
putting new wind in the sails of humanitarian intervention.”52 This begs 
any number of questions; the most important is the overweening claim 
that R2P represent a new norm of international law. 
It is also worth noting the high causality rate. As always, accurate 
figures are impossible to verify. One source indicates that somewhere 
between 30,000 and 50,000 Libyans had been killed six months after 
R2P intervention was launched and that, 
 
Measured as a percentage of Libya‟s population, and in that time 
period, this was a bloodier death toll than Iraq.
53
 
                                                   
51 These issues are further discussed in: Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A 
History of Humanitarianism (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2011) p 
230. 
52 Stewart Patrick, 2011, ex-US State Department. 
53 Lin Noueihed and Alex Warren The Battle for the Arab Spring: Revolution, 
Counter-Revolution and the Making of New Era (New Haven, USA: Yale University 
Press, 2012) p 185. 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
 
 
55 
 
5. NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION (NATO)54 
 
NATO‟s military intervention in Libya has been trumpeted as a great 
success, both for NATO itself as well as for global peace and security: 
 
NATO's operation in Libya has rightly been hailed as a model 
intervention. The alliance responded rapidly to a deteriorating 
situation that threatened hundreds of thousands of civilians rebelling 
against an oppressive regime. It succeeded in protecting those 
civilians and, ultimately, in providing the time and space necessary for 
local forces to overthrow Muammar al-Qaddafi. And it did so by 
involving partners in the region and sharing the burden among the 
alliance's members.
55
 
 
Nonetheless, while there may be sufficient justification in lauding the 
operation from the point of view of global political security, serious questions 
remain in the sphere of International Law, particularly on the issue of whether 
the operation moved beyond „protective‟ to become „active‟. There is 
documented evidence of western special forces engaged in operational 
military activity.
56
 
NATO (founded in 1949) has moved far beyond its original role to oppose 
and deter the power of the former USSR (its counterpart in Eastern Europe, 
the Warsaw Pact, was founded in 1955 and disbanded in 1991). The active 
expansion of NATO away from its original aims is illustrated in the fact that 
the first actual use of force by NATO was in Bosnia in 1994, followed by 
Kosovo in 1999. A key development lies in the procedures designed for „dual 
control‟. In Bosnia, for instance, these dual arrangements gave the UN control 
over NATO‟s actions. Similarly, in Afghanistan, the International Security 
Assistance Forces (ISAF) operates under NATO leadership despite the fact 
that approximately 18 non-NATO states (including Australia, New Zealand 
and Jordan) contribute armed forces to ISAF. 
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The NATO military intervention in Libya (code-named „Operation 
Unified Protector‟) needs to be seen in the context of this evolution of 
NATO‟s role, in particular, its relationship with the UN and any mandate it 
might receive from the Security Council.
57
 NATO‟s seven-month intervention 
in Libya began on 31 March 2011 with taking control of all military 
operations for Libya under resolutions 1970(2011) and 1973 (2011). It should 
be noted, however, that NATO only took over formal oversight of the 
operations after the United States, the UK and France had already initiated a 
no-fly zone and an arms embargo. The operations ended on 31 October 2011. 
In addition to its active military involvement, NATO Operation Unified 
Protector supported the implementation of the arms embargo and the 
enforcement of the no-fly zone through the verification of shipping activities 
both within and outside of Libyan territorial waters. 
There are a number of issues that need debate. The first relates to the 
legitimacy of any Security Council delegation to NATO. Second, NATO‟s 
mandate was for an air presence over Libya and off-shore naval action. This 
did not, either explicitly or implicitly, authorise an extension to ground troops. 
Third, it was clear that NATO‟s operations morphed from protection of 
civilians to direct, military assistance to a number of armed „rebel‟ groups. 
The latter would be considered as combatants under International Law 
concerns scrutiny and accountability; it is clear that this was not a matter that 
was either debated or even considered by the Security Council. Fourth, there 
are real concerns regarding the lack of oversight, in terms of the command 
structure, exercised by the Security Council over NATO. This leads on to the 
fifth issue, of scrutiny and accountability. Civilian casualties (over 1,100 
deaths and 4,500 wounded) are directly attributed to the NATO action and 
there has been an acknowledgement of weapons systems failures and 
accidental killing of rebels. None of these issues has been sufficiently 
considered or clarified. 
 
The Command Structure in NATO’s Libyan Operation 
 
The U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO Ivo H. Daalder and top 
NATO commander Admiral James Stavridis trumpeted the Libya operation as 
"a model of intervention."
58
 They argue that the mission protected thousands 
of lives, minimized collateral damage, and enabled the overthrow of one of 
the world's most oppressive regimes and without a single allied casualty: 
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"When a group of countries wants to launch a joint intervention as a coalition-
-which confers political legitimacy--only NATO can provide the common 
command structure and capabilities necessary." 
59
  
These sentiments, however, disguise the initial lack of coherence and a 
clear vision of the military intervention. The lack of clarity with regard to the 
early stages of the operation cannot be better illustrated by the fact that the 
major participants could not even agree on a codename for the operation: the 
US, French and UK. The unprecedented, three-pronged command is reflected 
in the different names for the operation: the French called it Harmattan (the 
name of a hot wind that blows over the Sahara); in Britain, it was Operation 
Ellamy; and in the US, it was Odyssey Dawn. What was clear, however, was 
that, even within the ranks of NATO allies, there was a measure of opposition 
to NATO control. It was reported that French President Nicolas Sarkozy 
initially opposed not just the proposal that NATO would take control but even 
the very involvement of NATO, on the grounds that this would send the 
wrong message to Arab nations. Similarly, Turkey, angered by the fact that 
the French President had failed to invite it to attend a crucial summit meeting, 
had refused to give carte blanche to the NATO imposition of a no-fly zone 
over Libya.
60
 Western diplomats were reported as saying that Sarkozy angered 
Britain and the US by announcing French planes were already in the air and 
ready to attack Libya before many of his allies had even decided on military 
action, and before informing his partners.
61
 
 
Legitimacy of the NATO Involvement 
 
What criteria are we to use when adjudicating on the crucial issue raised 
here: was the NATO intervention „legitimate‟? If the only criterion was 
whether it had received the approval of the UN, though the Security Council, 
then the question is easily answered. This, however, is to set the standard too 
low. In post-conflict Iraq, the much-trumpeted test was that elections had 
taken place. This criterion is similarly beset with difficulty. The holding of 
elections says nothing about corruption, the deadening hold of tribal and clan 
loyalties or of the protection of civil liberties (especially the protection of the 
rights of women and of religious and racial minorities). In the West, too, there 
is the added fear that the parties that win these elections, primarily the Muslim 
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Brotherhood may not form governments much to liking of western 
chancelleries. 
It is also clear that dissenting voices are making themselves heard on the 
„blogosphere‟ and internet. YouTube video clips publicise the fatalities caused 
by the military intervention in particularly gruesome detail
62
 while radical and 
alternative voices refer to: “The U.S./NATO conquest of Libya [as] another 
step in a new scramble for Africa, this time with the U.S. rather than the 
European powers in the lead”.63 These detractors may, in the West, represent 
the views of a minority but there is the very real possibility that these views 
exert an appeal in those parts of the Middle-East pre-disposed to view such 
interventions with suspicion and dread. These are, ultimately, markers for any 
future intervention which the international legal order cannot afford to ignore. 
 
Non-compliance 
 
There are real concerns regarding compliance with the relevant 
resolutions, and with the provisions of the UN Charter with regard to the 
provision of arms and munitions to rebel forces and, in particular, to the use of 
ground forces by both NATO as well as non-NATO forces. It appears, for 
instance, that that in a clear breach of the SC Resolutions, French forces had 
airlifted weapons to insurgents while Qatari troops had been involved in 
training rebel troops as well as assisted in direct fighting.
64
 A useful indicator 
lies in the report of the Committee of Experts (see below) set up to scrutinise 
operations under the Security Council Resolutions and to consider issues of 
non-compliance. 
 
6. COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS 
 
One facet of Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011) deserves greater 
attention and scrutiny. Paragraph 24 of the Resolution specifically called for 
the creation of a Committee of Experts to oversee the relevant sanctions 
measures. The mandate of the Committee of Experts was subsequently 
expanded by Resolution 1973. The tasks of the Committee were set out in 
paragraph 24 as follows: 
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24. Requests the Secretary-General to create for an initial period of 
one year, in consultation with the Committee, a group of up to eight 
experts ("Panel of Experts"), under the direction of the Committee to 
carry out the following tasks: 
(a) Assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in 
paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 (2011) and this resolution; 
(b) Gather, examine and analyse information from States, relevant 
United Nations bodies, regional organisations and other interested 
parties regarding the implementation of the measures decided in 
resolution 1970 (2011) and this resolution, in particular incidents of 
non-compliance; 
(c) Make recommendations on actions the Council, or the Committee 
or State, may consider to improve implementation of the relevant 
measures; 
(d) Provide to the Council an interim report on its work no later than 
90 days after the Panel's appointment, and a final report to the Council 
no later than 30 days prior to the termination of its mandate with its 
findings and recommendations; 
 
The Committee presented its Report to the Secretary General on17 
February 2012.
65
 While it is not possible at this stage to deal with the intricate 
detail of the Report, some of its main findings may profitably be set out. 
The important point to be made was that the Report makes it clear that 
NATO-led forces, and others, had directly transferred military related materiel 
to the anti-Qaddafi rebels: 
 
During the Panel‟s visits to Benghazi in July 2011, Libyan opposition 
military sources, as well as international observers, explained to the 
Panel the difficulties that revolutionary forces had been facing in 
terms of military combat: the lack of weapons and ammunition, the 
lack of organization and the difficulty of communicating across a 
single and between the different fronts of the conflict, as well as the 
lack of experience of the majority of civilians who took up arms 
against the Qadhafi [sic] forces. While the opposition gained more 
experience and organized itself better with time, and seized increasing 
numbers of weapons from Qadhafi‟s bunkers and forces, Libyan 
sources also explained that foreign military support, including 
deliveries of military materiel, had been crucial.
66
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It is submitted that the actions of the British, the French, the Italians and 
the United States in supplying military materiel as well as military advice and 
personnel to the rebels, went beyond the letter no less than the spirit of the 
Security Council Resolutions.
67
 Moreover, in a foretaste of what was to come, 
supplies were also made to the National Transitional Council, thus creating a 
dynamic of irreconcilable tension between the NTC and the ad hoc rebel 
groups. 
Moreover, this extended to military and strategic advice and secondment 
of military advisers. This was true of all NATO allies, particularly of the 
United Kingdom, as the Report makes clear: 
 
83. In a letter dated 26 April 2011 (S/2011/269), the United Kingdom 
notified the Secretary-General of the United Kingdom‟s intention to 
supply personal protective equipment to the National Transitional 
Council as well as the provision of a small team of military advisers to 
mentor and advise the National Transitional Council headquarters on 
how it might organize its internal structures, prioritize its resources 
and improve communications. On 25 October 2011, the United 
Kingdom notified the Committee in accordance with paragraph 13 of 
Security Council resolution 2009 (2011) of the United Kingdom‟s 
intention to provide a military assistance team to the Libyan 
authorities for the purposes of providing operational assistance, 
training and mentoring on security issues, including reform of the 
armed services, counterterrorism and counter-insurgency.
68
 
 
The direct military involvement also came from the United Arab 
Emirates, particularly Qatar and Saudi Arabia.
69
 It is not any wonder that 
some members of the Security Council, primarily Russia and China, have 
come to regret the fact that they did not exercise their power of veto, a crucial 
factor with regard to their reluctance to approve Security Council action in 
Syria. 
 
7. WIDER IMPLICATIONS OF THE LIBYA INTERVENTION 
 
There cannot be any doubt that the massive proliferation of weapons and 
ammunition in the Libya intervention has seeped into neighbouring states, 
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particularly Mali, Niger, Chad and Mauretania. In addition, the exodus of 
return of migrants from Libya, some of them mercenaries formerly employed 
by the regime has fuelled instability, criminality and political upheaval with 
potentially far-reaching consequences. As the Security Council‟s Committee 
of Experts has reported:  
 
While it is difficult to assess the precise impact of the Libyan crisis on 
these areas, the fact-finding missions conducted by the Panel in the 
region indicate that armed insecurity in neighbouring countries such 
as northern Mali and northern Niger has risen recently, with increased 
levels of weapons trafficking, armed robberies, terrorist activity and 
the resumption of insurgent movements. The Panel believes that the 
proliferation of weapons originating from Libya is exacerbating the 
already precarious security situation in certain parts of the region and 
that careful monitoring and enforcement of the arms embargo are 
therefore critical.
70
 
 
The Committee further reports: 
 
The fragile infrastructure of these states has been severely challenged 
in the peripheries by the mixture of large numbers of returnees, loss of 
remittances, weapons influxes, and the withdrawal of international 
aid, itself a result of increased insecurity. As a result, pre-existing 
conflicts have resurged, new armed opposition groups have emerged, 
and greater space for terrorist organizations and international criminal 
networks has opened.
71
 
 
On the other hand, and in the interest of balance, the removal of Qaddafi 
has also had the beneficial effect of removing a destabilizing force in the 
wider region. As a specific instance, the Committee of Experts reported that 
the Sudan, 
 
…expressed relief that a long-term sponsor of instability in its country 
was removed and predicted that peace-making efforts in Darfur would 
improve as a result…. and arms proliferation, while worrying, was 
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offset by the removal of Libya as a long-term future sponsor of armed 
opposition in the Sudan.
72
  
 
On many levels, Libya represents a success of interventionist global 
policy: “in theory, Libya has achieved the most far-reaching change of any 
country in the Arab Spring.”73  
Perhaps the ultimate achievement of the intervention in Libya is that it has 
crafted an interpretation of the responsibility to protect doctrine that will serve 
as a marker for the future, despite all the complexity and ambiguity that the 
doctrine carries with it. It may be that the critics of R2P are right: the Libya 
intervention was nothing more than a line drawn on shifting sands; but it is a 
line, nonetheless. 
Significantly, the voluminous discussion of the legitimacy of the 
intervention in Libya cannot, and should not, detract attention from the 
democracy-affirming nature of the events of the Arab Spring and its 
accompanying grant of a new dignity to the peoples of this region. Perhaps the 
first attempt to „audit‟ issues of good governance in the Arab world came in 
the form of the 2002 Arab Development Report (under the aegis of the United 
Nations).
74
 The Report outlined three major „deficits‟ that operated to 
handicap development and progress. The first was the freedom deficit; the 
second, the women‟s empowerment deficit; and the third was the knowledge 
deficit. It is submitted that amongst the details of the academic and political 
critique, the legitimacy of the Libyan intervention will ultimately be tested by 
whether these deficits are overcome.
75
 
 
8. POSTSCRIPT 
 
The recent history of post-conflict states is not a happy one. The 
legitimacy of intervention needs considerable re-evaluation in the light 
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of the slow progress in states as diverse as Bosnia (and the other states 
of the former Yugoslavia), Iraq and Afghanistan. It would not be 
unduly pessimistic to describe these states as not fully engaged with the 
ideals and processes of a functioning and accountable democracy. 
While Qaddafi‟s rule is over, and his family and cronies face the 
inevitable process of accountability, the legitimacy of the Libya 
„adventure‟ will ultimately rest on whether there is a successful 
transition to a functioning and fully-operational democracy. While it is 
true that democratic elections have taken place, commentators have 
pointed to a number of factors that have the potential to escalate.76  
In no particular order these include, first, the psychological vacuum 
left by the removal of Qaddafi‟s personality cult; it is unlikely that the 
succeeding politicians will meet this. As Pargeter puts it, “getting over 
a leader as all-encompassing as Qaddafi is not going to be easy.”77 
Second, the civil war and the intervention has devastated the oil 
production, the main source of revenue. As the experience of Iraq 
indicates, returning to a fully-functioning economy will require both 
time and expertise. Third, tens of thousands of Libyans have been 
killed or seriously injured, creating a legacy of suspicion and hatred. 
The process of peace and reconciliation will, inevitably, be a long and 
difficult one. Fourth, the tribal-clan fragmentation of Libyan society 
has already been noted above. Unless the newly-elected politicians can 
manage to reach out in a spirit of inclusiveness and manage these 
conflicting loyalties, there is a real danger that Libya could split apart 
in the process of „Balkanisation‟ witnessed, with horrendous 
consequences, in the former Yugoslavia. Pessimistically, as in Iraq and 
Egypt, it is unlikely that any of the newly-elected politicians have the 
necessary charisma and ruthlessness to match Qaddafi‟s bizarre brand 
of „Big Man-Strong Arm‟ control.  
Finally, and by no means exhaustively, the question arises as to 
whether the international community will be either willing or capable 
of continued monitoring of events in Libya. Unlike Bosnia and Kosovo, 
there seems little possibility of a NATO peacekeeping force, while the 
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wider events in the region (particularly in Syria and Mali, and the after-
effects of the allied withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan) may 
indicate that it is not a fore-gone conclusion that there may yet exist a 
failed state in this strategic part of the Middle-East-Mediterranean. 
